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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the rule requir-
ing authentication of documents prior to admitting them in evi-
dence, by mandating the exclusion of relevant evidence, operates
as a barrier to determining the facts in issue to which those docu-
ments are relevant and, in some cases, as a barrier to determining
authenticity itself.
I. Tim AUTHENTICATION RuLE
Sections 1400-1421 of the California Evidence Code together offer
a typical example of the authentication rule.' Section 1401 states:
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1. Rule 67 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides: "Authentication
of a writing is required before it may be received in evidence. Authenti-
cation may be by evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of its authen-
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"(a) Authentication of a writing is required before it may be re-
ceived in evidence." Section 1400 states: "Authentication of a
ticity or by any other means provided by law. If the judge finds that a
writing (a) is at least thirty years old at the time it is offered, and (b) is
in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, and
(c) at the time of its discovery was in a place in which such a document, if
authentic, would be likely to be found it is sufficiently authenticated."
Rule 601 of the ALI Model Code of Evidence provides:
A writing, offered in evidence as authentic, is admissible, if
(a) sufficient evidence has been introduced to sustain a finding
of its authenticity, or
(b) the judge finds that the writing
(i) is at least thirty years old at the time it is so offered,
and
(i) is in such condition as to create no suspicion concern-
ing its authenticity, and
(iii) at the time of its discovery was in a place in which
such a document, if authentic, would be likely to be
found.
Rule 901 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the U.S. District Courts
and Magistrates provides:
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way
of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or iden-
tification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that
a matter is what it is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert opinion
as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not
acquired for purposes of the litigation.
(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison
by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which
have been authenticated.
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance,
contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive charac-
teristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
(5) Voice Identification. Identification of a voice, whether
heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission
or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time
under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.
(6) Telephone Conversations. Telephone conversations, by
evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the
time by the telephone company to a particular person or business,
if (i) in the case of a person, circumstances, including self-iden-
tification, show the person answering to be the one called or (ii)
in the case of a business, the call was made to a place of business
and the conversation related to business reasonably transacted over
the telephone.
(7) Public Records or Reports. Evidence that a writing au-
thorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or
filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, state-
ment, or date compilation, in any form, is from the public office
where items of this nature are kept.
writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain
a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence
claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any other means
provided by law." Among the types of evidence which can be used
to authenticate writings are the testimony of witnesses to the
writing,2 admissions,3 the testimony of persons familiar with the
handwriting of the supposed writer,4 comparisons between the writ-
ing and other examples of the supposed writer's handwritingu
evidence that the writing was received in response to a communi-
cation to the supposed writer,6 and the contents of the writing it-
self.7 These, however, are not the only types of evidence which
can be used for authentication, and, indeed, any otherwise admissi-
ble evidence can be used for such a purpose.8
It should be noted that, while the court must, before admitting a
writing, determine that the evidence is sufficient for the trier of
fact to find it authentic, once the evidence is admitted the court does
not direct the trier to find the writing authentic, and the trier is
still free to find it unauthentic.9
IT. THE BARRIER OF AUTHENTICATION
It is the central contention of this article that the authentica-
tion doctrine is an unjustifiable restriction on the admissibility of
evidence, because in some cases it is superfluous and in others it
operates to distort the relative persuasive force of the parties' cases.
First, as will be shown, in many instances where the proponent
of a writing has the burden of proving an ultimate fact in issue
(8) Ancient Documents or Data Compilations. Evidence that
a document or data compilation, in any form, (i) is in such con-
dition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity (ii)
was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely be (iii) has
been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is offered.
(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or
system used to produce a result and showing that the process or
system produces an accurate result.
(10) Methods Provided by Statute or Rule. Any method
of authentication or identification provided by Act of Congress or
by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
2. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1413 (West 1968).
3. Id. 8 1414.
4. Id. §§ 1415-16.
5. Id. 88 1415, 1417, 1418.
6. Id. 8 1420.
7. Id. § 1421.
8. Id. § 1410.
9. CAL. Evin. CODE §§ 402, 403 (West 1968); see aZso, Rule 8 of the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence; Rule 104 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for
the U.S. District Courts and Magistrates.
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(UF) and has produced enough evidence of that fact to send the is-
sue to the trier of fact, his writing will have been authenticated by
the same evidence. In those cases the authentication requirement
would be superfluous. (Whenever the party with the burden of
proof has failed to make out a case for the UF which is sufficient
in law to go to the trier of fact, the court can of course keep the
issue from ever reaching the trier.) Second, in the cases where the
proponent of the writing would make out a sufficient case of the
UF by using the writing but does not make out a sufficient case
of the writing's authenticity, exclusion of the writing will make the
case of the proponent weaker in the eyes of the court (in determin-
ing sufficiency of the evidence of the UF to send the issue to the
trier) and in the eyes of the trier of fact (assuming the hurdle of
sufficiency is passed) than it really is. Similarly, where the pro-
ponent of the writing is not the party with the burden of proving
the U-F, and his evidence does not authenticate the writing, ex-
clusion of the writing will make his case seem weaker in the eyes
of the trier of fact than it really is.
Both these situations-that in which the authentication rule is
superfluous and that in which it has a distorting influence on the
case-will be examined below, along with the various rationales of-
fered for the rule.
1. The superfluity of the authentication rule in many cases where
proponent can make out a legally sufficient case for the exist-
ence or non-existence of the UF.
The probative value of any item of evidence offered to prove the
UF is in part a function of the other evidence so offered. Suppose
that one out of every three times we find a particular item of evi-
dence (EI) we find the UF. The probative value of E1 by itself with
respect to the UF is therefore 33%. The symbol p (UF/E-1) - will
designate this fact. Suppose that the probative value of another
item of evidence (E2) is also 33% (i.e., p (UF/E2 ) =1). Finally,
suppose that nine times out of ten, when we find El and E2 together,
we find UF (i.e., p (UF/EAE2 ) =O-). In such a case the probative
value of E1 (or E2) with respect to the UF is 90% when that evi-
dence is introduced after E2 (or E1). However, if both E1 and E2
had to have independent probative values of more than 50% to be
admitted into evidence-i.e., if both p (UF/E 1) and p (UF/E2) had to
be more than 50%-neither could be, and what would in fact be a
case where a 90% probability of the UF existed could not be made
out. Fortunately the law does not usually require that each item
of evidence be sufficient in itself to prove the UF.
The probative value of some evidence, including, but surely not
limited to, many writings, rests upon two conspicuous inferences:
(1) the inference from the fact of the evidence to its authentic-
ity (i.e., that it is what it purports to be), and (2) the inference
from the evidence as authentic to what it purports to prove.' 0
Let us suppose, for example, that the UF to be proved in a law-
suit is that John Doe I is climbing a particular mountain. The
town newspaper has received a letter signed "John Doe" announc-
ing the author's intention to climb that mountain. There are three
John Does in the town. In the absence of further information and
in view of the chance of deception and other factors which might re-
duce the probability that one of them wrote the letter, the prob-
ability that the letter was written by John Doe I, i.e., the probabil-
ity of its authenticity, is less than 33%. Let us also assume that
when someone writes such a letter he does what he says he will
do 75% of the time. Therefore, the probative value of the letter in
proving that John Doe I is climbing the mountain, if one knows only
that there are three John Does in town, is less than 25%, the product
of the two probabilities. (This assumes, of course, that the letter
has no probative value unless written by John Doe I, i.e., unless
authentic.) In other words, the probative value of the letter is
primarily a function of the probability of its authenticity and the
probability of what it purports to prove if it is authentic.
It is at this point that the earlier discussion of the interdepend-
10. The term "conspicuous" is used in referring to the two inferences
because it would seem that in reality all single inferences could be divided
into two or more inferences. For example, the fact that a gun with de-
fendant's name on it was found at the murder scene usually is seen as
two inferences away from defendant's guilt: (1) the inference that the gun
was in fact defendant's gun and (2) the inference that defendant was the
guilty party. But inference (2) can be broken up into more inferences,
e.g., (1) defendant brought the gun to the murder scene, (2) he brought it
there at the time of the murder, (3) he used it to commit the murder.
The number of such possible "inconspicuous" inferences is co-extensive
with the number of facts which would destroy the inference from de-
fendant's gun to his guilt, e.g., that he brought the gun to the scene at an-
other time, or that someone else brought the gun there, etc. Conversely,
what are usually regarded as two or more "conspicuous" inferences, e.g.,
from the fact of a shirt with defendant's name on it to the fact that it was
defendant's shirt and from that fact to his guilt, are often treated as one
inference, e.g., from an unauthenticated writing to the fact that it is offered
to prove, so that the intermediate inference no longer is conspicuous.
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ence of the probative values of evidence becomes significant. The
probative value of the letter, the only other evidence being that
there are three John Does in town, is, as has been indicated, less
than 25%. But as we introduce other evidence into the case (e.g.,
John Doe I is out of town while the others are not, John Doe I is
a mountain climber, a man was seen climbing the mountain in
question, etc.), the probability that the UF is true increases and
along with it the probative value of each item of evidence relative
to the other evidence in the case. (To take the earlier example
where E, and E2 each established a 33% probability of the UF, but
together established a 90% probability, one could say that the pro-
bative value of E, (or E2) with respect to the UF is 90% given that
E2 (or Ei) exists.)
Furthermore-and herein lies one of the most telling criticisms of
the authentication rule-just as the true probative value of a writ-
ing is a function of the probative value of all other evidence in the
case, so too is the probability of its authenticity a function of its
probative value. In other words, the probability of authenticity is
a function of the probability of the UF established by the writing
and all other evidence in the case.'1 For example, if all the evidence
in the case of John Doe I created a 90% probability that he was on
the mountain in question (the UF), the probability that the letter
describing the plan to climb the mountain was sent by John Doe
I and not someone else (i.e, the probability of its authenticity)
might be pretty close to 90%, too. That probability, p (A), would be
established by adding:
(a) The probability that John Doe I sent the letter, given that a
writing such as the one in question existed, and that John Doe I
was climbing the mountain (UF)-i.e., the p(A/UF), say, 8§6o-
weighted by the probability of the UF, p (UF), given above as 90%
or 9o; and
(b) The probability that John Doe I sent the letter, given that
the writing existed and that the man climbing the mountain was
not John Doe I (NUF) -i.e., the p (A/NUF), say, 'o--weighted by
the probability of the NUF, p (NUF), given as 10% or 'Ao.
11. It is quite permissible as well as logical to use the contents of a
writing as evidence of its authenticity. See: CAL. Evm. CODE § 1421
(West 1968).
Expressed symbolically, this formula states:
p (A) = [p (A/UF) x p (UF) ] + [p (A/NUF) x p (NUF) ].
When the figures assigned above are inserted into the formula,
the p(A) - [11%o x Ko] + [1Ao x Ao] = 8%oo or 89%.
Since the higher the probability of the UF, the higher the prob-
ability of authenticity of a writing offered to prove the UP, two
propositions follow regarding the authentication rule: (1) au-
thenticity cannot be determined before all the evidence of the Uri
has been offered by the proponent of the UF; (2) when the propo-
nent has introduced sufficient evidence to have the case for the UF
go to the trier of fact, he will have in many, if not most, cases intro-
duced sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find the writing au-
thentic, and the authentication rule should have no effect on the
evidence. (These two propositions apply also to situations in which
the proponent of the writing is not the party who has the burden of
proving the UF but who has introduced enough evidence of his
own against the existence of the UF for the trier to find that more
probably than not the UF does not exist.)
There is nothing in the authentication rule, taken literally, which
precludes a finding of authenticity based on all of the evidence of-
fered for or against the UF. However, most lawyers, judges, and
commentators conceive of authentication as a process involving
only a small part of the evidence for or against the UF, on which evi-
dence the determination of the admissibility of the writing is
based. Thus, the procedure envisioned is for the court, in a jury
trial, to decide whether a sufficient probability of authenticity is
shown by the proponent's evidence before allowing the writing to
be presented to the jury; and this procedure would break down if
the proponent of the writing sought to introduce, at the hearing on
admissibility, all of the evidence for or against the UF that he had
already presented or intended to present to the jury. In a court trial
there would be no need for this total duplication of the evidence;
but by the same token there would be no need for a finding on the
issue of authenticity, since such a finding could not be made until
the close of the proponent's case, at which time the court's deci-
sion on the sufficiency of the case for the UF might well subsume its
decision on authenticity. It is apparent that the process of authen-
tication actually used in trials is not the process of authentication
that was described above as being a true process of authentica-
tion, for in actual practice the evidence on the issue of authentica-
tion does not duplicate all the evidence for or against the UF. But if
all of this evidence is not offered on the question of authenticity,
then some documents will be excluded for which a case of authen-
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ticity can be made out. This is why it can be claimed that the au-
thentication rule (as actually used in practice) may be a barrier to
authentication.
2. The superfluity of the authentication rule in all cases in which
the proponent of the writing fails to make out a legally sufficient
case for the existence or non-existence of the UF and has the
burden of so doing.
Where the writing represents substantially all of the evidence
of the UF that the proponent produces, his failure to establish
that the writing was more probably than not authentic would
likely be tantamount to failure to establish more probably than not
that the UF was true. If the proponent has the burden of proving
the UF, nothing is accomplished by excluding the writing, since the
ruling on the sufficiency of evidence will effect the same result.
The famous case of Keegan v. Green Giant Co.,12 in which the
plaintiff failed to authenticate the label on a can of peas, is a good
example of a case where failure to authenticate and failure to make
out a sufficient case of the UF (that defendant canned the peas)
were really synonymous since plaintiff's evidence that defendant
canned the peas consisted almost entirely of the label attached to
the can. While the holding of the court was almost surely in error
regarding the probability of both the UF and authenticity, the
case is nonetheless illustrative of the connection of legal suffi-
ciency of evidence and authenticity where the writing is the pri-
mary evidence of the UF.13
3. The barrier to truth presented by the authentication rule
where authenticity cannot be established as more probable than
not, even considering all the evidence for or against the UF.
It seems clear that true authentication is a superfluous procedure
12. 150 Me. 282, 110 A.2d 599 (Sup. Jud. Ct., 1954).
13. The court's decision was almost surely wrong because the probability
of the UF, i.e., that defendant had canned the peas in question, considering
the label, the fact that defendant did can peas and did use labels identical
to the one in question thereon, and the fact that the grocery store from
which the peas were obtained did purchase defendant's products, was surely
high enough to be legally sufficient. This being true, the probability of
authenticity of the label was undoubtedly sufficiently high for legal au-
thentication, the probability of non-authenticity given that the can was de-
fendant's being almost zero.
when it merely duplicates the determination of the sufficiency
of the case for or against the UF. It is also clear that insofar as the
actual practice of authentication does not entail hearing all the evi-
dence for or against the UF, it fails in some instances to allow into
evidence a document which could have been authenticated. What
remains to be discussed are those situations in which the case of
the proponent of the writing is legally sufficient (or else is not re-
quired to be because he does not have the burden of proof), but
the case does not establish authenticity as more probable than not.
In the cases in which the proponent of a writing has the burden
of proving the UF and can make out a legally sufficient case of the
UF but cannot make out a legally sufficient case of authenticity, ap-
plication of the authentication rule resulting in not admitting the
writing has two possible consequences: (1) it may cause what was,
with the writing, a legally sufficient case to become a legally insuf-
ficient case; (2) even if it does not lead to failure to make out a suf-
ficient case, it will make the proponent's case for the UF appear
weaker in the eyes of the trier of fact than it actually is. In cases
in which the proponent of the writing does not have the burden of
proving (or disproving) the UF and cannot establish authenticity
as more probable than not, exclusion of the writing will make his
case seem weaker to the trier of fact than it actually is. Indeed,
since requiring him to prove the authenticity of his writing might
in some instances require him to produce enough evidence to make
out a legally sufficient case for or against the UF, the authentica-
tion rule could become almost as onerous as shifting the burden of
proving or disproving the UF to the proponent of the writing-an
undesirable result in any case but especially unfortunate if the pro-
ponent is a criminal defendant, hoping to raise but a reasonable
doubt of his guilt. In view of these consequences, what is said to
justify the authentication rule?
One justification that may be readily dismissed is that the docu-
ment is not relevant unless proved to be authentic. 14 This justifi-
cation rests on a mistaken assumption about what constitutes rele-
vancy. Evidence is relevant when it tends to make the probabil-
ity of the UF more likely or less likely than it is without the evi-
dence.15 In other words, evidence is relevant when it is probative.
But an unauthenticated writing can be probative even though its
probative value rests entirely on a series of inferences, one of which
14. See, for example, RoTHsTEN, EvDENcE :n A NuTSHFrL 46 (1970).
15. See, for example, CAL. EvIn. CODE § 210 (West 1968); Rule 1(2) of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence; Rule 1(12) of the ALl Model Code of
Evidence; Rule 401 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the U.S. District
Courts and Magistrates; McCovmcK, EvimEcE 433-41 (2d ed. 1972).
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is that the writing is authentic. As long as there is a chance that
the writing is authentic, the writing is relevant. By itself the un-
authenticated writing could not be sufficient to prove the UF if
its proponent had the burden of proving it. But relevancy and suf-
ficiency are not synonymous. Only if the writing would be rele-
vant to rebutting the proof of the UF if unauthentic would the
proponent offering it to prove the UF have to authenticate it to es-
tablish its relevancy to his case; and even if he failed to do so the
writing would still be relevant to the case of his adversary.
If testing for relevancy is not an adequate justification for the
authentication rule, what about protecting against forgery and
other fraud? 16 Undoubtedly the authentication rule screens out
some forgeries and other fraudulent writings. However, it is quite
probable that even without the authentication rule, i.e., even
without the ability to exclude forgeries and fraudulent writings
from evidence, very few forgeries and fraudulent writings would be
taken as authentic by a trier of fact. The party attempting to im-
peach the document could offer evidence of its forgery or fraud-
ulent character and stress its dubious quality in argument to the
trier. He also could invoke the rule allowing a negative inference
from the fact that a party introduced weaker evidence when he had
access to stronger, which rule should be applied to proponents of
writings who have, but who do not introduce, evidence regarding
the execution of the document, the handwriting on the document, or
the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the document.17
With these protections against forgeries and frauds, this particu-
lar function of the authentication rule has minimal value indeed.
Finally, Wigmore's justification for the rule must be considered:
(1) Most documents bear a signature, or otherwise purport on
their face to be of a certain person's authorship. Hence, a special
necessity exists for separating the external evidence of authorship
from the mere existence of the purporting document. A horse or a
coat contains upon itself no indications of ownership; when it is
claimed that Doe wore it or rode it, all can appreciate that this ele-
ment is missing and must be supplied by evidence. But a document
purports in itself to indicate its authorship; and the perception
that this element is nevertheless missing, and must still be supplied,
is not likely to occur. There is a natural tendency to forget it. Thus
16. McCoRMucK, supra note 15, at 544-45; see also: Strong, Liberalizing
the Authentication of Private Writings, 52 CoRNmI. L.Q. 284 (1966).
17. See, for example, CAL. Evin. CODE §§ 412, 413 (West 1968); 2 WiG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 278, 285 (3rd ed. 1940).
it has constantly to be emphasized by the judicial requirement of
evidence to that effect.
(2) The original of a writing is usually presented to the tribunal
'in specie,' while other material objects are not required to be and
seldom are brought into court (except such articles as the tools of
a crime or the clothes of a victim); so that, in practice, the most
common opportunity for the operation of this aberrant tendency oc-
curs for writings, visibly in existence and mutely suggesting that
they are all that they purport to be. Thus the mental tendency is
especially forcible, frequent, and misleading where documents
are involved.
For these two reasons, then, it has happened that the specific rules
that have grown up concerning modes of authentication have come
to relate to writings alone.
The general principle has been enforced that a writing purport-
ing to be of a certain authorship cannot go to the jury as possibly
genuine, merely on the strength of this purport; there must be some
evidence of the genuineness (or execution) of it .... 18 (Empha-
sis original.)
The upshot of Wigmore's justification is that the trier of fact may
forget that the inferences from the fact of the writing to the UP
include an inference of authenticity and may merely assume the
writing is authentic. This is highly questionable. Indeed, since
the inference of authenticity is a "conspicuous" inference, it is more
probable that the trier of fact will be aware of it than that the trier
will notice all the "inconspicuous" inferences which connect ordi-
nary evidence with the UF. A trier of fact may be overwhelmed by
evidence of the defendant's fingerprints at the scene of the crime,
forgetting that the prints do not establish the time or circumstances
of the defendant's presence. Is it more likely that the trier will for-
get that a writing's probative value rests on an inference of au-
thenticity, especially with counsel for the other side stressing in
argument that no direct proof of execution has been offered? Wig-
more's fears, if valid, prove too much; but they are more likely
highly exaggerated, especially at a time when most litigants can and
do obtain assistance of counsel.
What other justifications might exist for the authentication rule?
There is no requirement of admissibility that evidence generally be
of any specific probative value. It need only be probative, and un-
authenticated writings can be. Moreover, many unauthenticated
writings are more probative of the UF than are writings which are
authenticated. For example, a letter containing an admission of
the UF and signed with defendant's name may be more probative
of the UF than a letter written by defendant not admitting the UF
and only obliquely relevant thereto, even if the former cannot be
18. 7 WiGMORE ox EVIDENCE § 2130 (3rd ed. 1940); see also McCoRMIcK,
supra note 15, at 544-45.
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legally authenticated and the latter's authenticity is conceded, if
there is any evidence at all of the former's authenticity. If the prob-
ability of the former's authenticity is 30%, which by hypothesis is
not high enough for legal authentication, and the probability of the
UF if the letter is authentic is 90%, the overall probative value of
the former would be 27%. Provided that the latter document if
authentic establishes less than a 27% chance of the UF, then the
probative value of the former document, with only a 30% proba-
bility of authenticity, would be higher than the probative value of
the latter, even if the latter were 100% authenticated.
Since the requirements of relevancy, the desire to prevent fraud
and screen out forgeries, and the need to make triers of fact aware
of all necessary inferences do not justify the authentication rule,
and since there is no requirement that evidence be of any particu-
lar probative value in order to be admissible, one must conclude
that the authentication rule should be abolished. Indeed, it is an
anomaly in its application only to writings. Consider a criminal
trial of a defendant named Joe Smith, accused of robbery. A wit-
ness for the prosecution testifies that she saw the robbery take place
and that the robber wore a jacket with the name "Joe Smith" embla-
zoned on the back. The victim testifies that the robber dropped his
knife, which the victim retrieved, and on which is engraved the
name "Joe Smith." The defendant's defense is an alibi, and he pre-
sents as his witness a bartender who testifies that at the time of the
robbery a man was in his bar and left his watch, on which is en-
graved the name, "Joe Smith." (It will be assumed that the embla-
zoned or engraved name on each of the three items above is put
there by the manufacturer of the item for likely purchase by per-
sons of the same name, not by the purchaser. This removes any
possibility that these items come within the authentication rule.)
The relevancy of each of these three items of evidence depends upon
an inference very similar to an inference of authenticity, that is, an
inference that the jacket, knife and watch are the possessions of the
defendant and not some other person. Yet the law does not require
that these items be shown to be more probably than not the posses-
sions of the defendant as a condition of their admissibility.19
19. The line between writings which must be authenticated and items
of evidence which do not have to be "authenticated" (whatever that would
Moreover, if it were to do so in the case of defendant's evidence,
the result would be comparable (although not identical) to shifting
the burden of proof of innocence to the party who theoretically
has only to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. There is no rea-
son for the law to take a different stance with regard to writings
than it takes with regard to non-documentary evidence.
III. Sumrv xY mN RECOMMENDATION
The authentication rule, followed literally, is superfluous in
many cases where the proponent of the writing can make out a le-
gally sufficient case for the existence or non-existence of the UF;
for in many cases the proponent can also authenticate his writing
by using all the evidence bearing on the UF. The authentication
rule as actually applied in practice, however, will often operate
to exclude writings which would be authenticated if all the evi-
dence relevant to the existence of the UF were considered. In prac-
tice, therefore, the authentication rule is itself a barrier to authen-
tication.
The authentication rule is also superfluous in all cases where even
if the writing is admitted, the proponent will fail to make out a le-
gally sufficient case and has the burden of so doing.
Where the proponent of the writing cannnot authenticate it, even
using all the evidence relevant to the existence of the UF, the au-
mean with respect to such evidence) is quite fuzzy. For example, in
Keegan v. Green Giant Co., supra note 12, it was immaterial whether de-
fendant was the actual author of the label. What was material was
whether defendant adopted the representations thereon as its representa-
tions, i.e., whether the label, by whomever written, was intended as a com-
munication by defendant and placed on the can by defendant for that
purpose. Similarly, when one buys an item such as a key ring with his
name on it he usually is intending to communicate something by means
of that key ring, to wit, that it belongs to him, even though he is not the
"author" of the writing thereon. Moreover, the dangers of fraudulent sub-
stitution and confusion of the trier of fact (though not of forgery) exist
for evidence such as the key ring and the jacket, knife and watch re-
ferred to above as well as for ordinary writings and labels. However,
these dangers exist, too, for evidence that has no writing at all on it. The
shape and color of a Coca-Cola bottle help identify the manufacturer of
the contents almost as much as the name thereon.
What one should conclude from this discussion is not that the authentica-
tion requirement should be extended to include proof of any connection
with a person as well as proof of the person's authorship as a condition of
admissibility, though there is some misleading language to that effect in
Wigmore. (WiGMom oN EviENcE, supra note 18, at § 2129). The evidence
must be shown to be relevant, of course, which is all that Wigmore re-
quires. It need not be shown to be connected with a certain person more
probably than not, which is what authentication requires. What one should
conclude is that the rule requiring authentication where it now applies
should give way to the requirement merely of relevancy.
[voL. 10: 266, 1973] Authentication of Documents
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thentication rule serves as a barrier to the discovery of truth by ex-
cluding probative evidence. Moreover, the rule cannot be justified
by appeals to the requirement of relevancy, to the danger of forgery
and fraud, to the possible confusion of the trier of fact, to any ficti-
tious standard of probative value, or to the practice followed with
evidence similar to writings. The requirement of sufficiency of evi-
dence, the negative inference which the law allows to be drawn
from the introduction of weaker evidence when the party possesses
stronger evidence, and the opportunity for opposing counsel to
introduce evidence of unauthenticity and to point out in argument
any lack of authentication are sufficient to accomplish any legiti-
mate purposes which the authentication rule now serves. It is
therefore recommended that the authentication rule be abolished.
